Charges of liberalism's "parochialism," combined with its supposed arrogant pretensions to universalism, have become popular tropes in an "age of multiculturalism." So in his essay "The Politics of Recognition," Charles Taylor argues that "liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges."3 It is worth noting that Taylor also wants to defend basic human rights norms, and he talks of distinguishing "fundamental" and "crucial" rights, rights "that have been recognized as such from the very beginning of the liberal tradition: rights to life, liberty, due process, free speech, free practice of religion, and so on."4 Such rights "should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched." In general, Taylor assumes that a regime that entrenches these rights, even if it pursues what he terms "strong collective goals," can still be a liberal one. 5 Bell insists that he too is interested in advancing the cause of human rights throughout the world, that is, in all cultures. Nowhere in his essay, however, does Bell define fundamental human rights, which makes it somewhat difficult to examine the cogency of his argument. Let us assume for the moment (what Bell might reject) that basic human rights are roughly equivalent to the rights-the "first generation rights"-as set forth in articles 1-20 of the United Nations's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. As contained in this document, human rights include, first, an assumption of the absolute equality of persons: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (article 2). This is followed by a list of enumerated rights (articles 3-20) that include the right to life, liberty, security of person; the right not to be subject to slavery, not to be subject to torture; rights of thought, conscience, speech, religion, association, peaceable assembly; the right to own property; and all the rights associated with due process of law: no arbitrary arrest or seizure, presumption of innocence until proven guilty, right to trial by jury, and so forth. These form what might be called the "liberal" rights of the declaration. The further "democratic" rights (article 21) include the right to take part in the government, either directly or through freely chosen representatives (21.1); the right to equal access to public service (21.2); and the "right" that the government be based on the will of the people and hold periodic elections with "universal and equal suffrage" (21.3). If we combine these two sets of rights, we come up with the forward a "universal" theory that rides roughshod over the cultural particularities of non-Western societies. One cannot be certain that the "interpretive" approach will do more for human rights, but that's where I'd place my bets. (p. 568) Charges of liberalism's "parochialism," combined with its supposed arrogant pretensions to universalism, have become popular tropes in an "age of multiculturalism." So in his essay "The Politics of Recognition," Charles Taylor argues that "liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges."3 It is worth noting that Taylor also wants to defend basic human rights norms, and he talks of distinguishing "fundamental" and "crucial" rights, rights "that have been recognized as such from the very beginning of the liberal tradition: rights to life, liberty, due process, free speech, free practice of religion, and so on."4 Such rights "should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched." In general, Taylor assumes that a regime that entrenches these rights, even if it pursues what he terms "strong collective goals," can still be a liberal one. 5 Bell insists that he too is interested in advancing the cause of human rights throughout the world, that is, in all cultures. Nowhere in his essay, however, does Bell define fundamental human rights, which makes it somewhat difficult to examine the cogency of his argument. Let us assume for the moment (what Bell might reject) that basic human rights are roughly equivalent to the rights-the "first generation rights"-as set forth in articles 1-20 of the United Nations's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. As contained in this document, human rights include, first, an assumption of the absolute equality of persons: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (article 2). This is followed by a list of enumerated rights (articles 3-20) that include the right to life, liberty, security of person; the right not to be subject to slavery, not to be subject to torture; rights of thought, conscience, speech, religion, association, peaceable assembly; the right to own property; and all the rights associated with due process of law: no arbitrary arrest or seizure, presumption of innocence until proven guilty, right to trial by jury, and so forth. These form what might be called the "liberal" rights of the declaration. The further "democratic" rights (article 21) include the right to take part in the government, either directly or through freely chosen representatives (21.1); the right to equal access to public service (21.2); and the "right" that the government be based on the will of the people and hold periodic elections with "universal and equal suffrage" (21.3). If we combine these two sets of rights, we come up with the basic principles of a liberal-democratic regime. Pretty clearly then, Bell would consider the United Nations's declaration to be just another example of "Western liberal parochialism" masquerading as universalism.
Perhaps Bell would want to narrow the range of what counts as a scheme of fundamental human rights to allow for cultural particularities. Perhaps he would want to jettison the "democratic elements" of a scheme of human rights to allow for a greater range of cultural variation but stick with the basic liberal rights, those rights that Taylor, for example, characterizes as "fundamental" and "unassailable." This would cause Bell difficulties, to be sure, since he is committed to the struggle for democracy in China. Nonetheless, he might argue that democratic principles are radically at odds with certain cultural traditions and should not be universally advanced. And perhaps he would want to go even further and endorse, as John Rawls does in his essay "The Law of Peoples,"6 a minimal conception of human rights, one that is intended to be neither distinctively liberal nor democratic. Rawls maintains in this essay that his goal, in part, is to outline a theory of human rights that is not "in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures"7 and that can, therefore, be endorsed by a wide range of cultures (i.e., can be the focus of an "overlapping consensus"). To this end, Rawls presents an absolute minimum list of basic human rights that any society must uphold in order to be what he terms a "member in good standing" of the "society of peoples." These include minimum rights to means of subsistence and security (the right to life), to liberty (freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation) and (personal) property, as well as formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (for example, that similar cases be treated similarly).8 According to Rawls, what he terms a "well-ordered hierarchical society" respects basic human rights, but such a society is neither liberal nor democratic: persons in society are not viewed as free and equal citizens with equal rights; a state religion, for example, may largely control governmental policy and grant certain privileges to that religion and its members; "individuals do not have the right of free speech as in a liberal society";9 and while there is not full liberty of conscience, persons are allowed to practice their religion "in peace and without fear" as members of distinct religious groups. In general, whatever rights persons possess accrue to them not as individuals, but as members of such groups or "corporate entities.""' What Rawls characterizes as a "well-ordered hierarchy" appears to be modeled in part on descriptions of the "millet system" of the Ottoman Empire, in which Islam was the established religion and Muslims constituted basic principles of a liberal-democratic regime. Pretty clearly then, Bell would consider the United Nations's declaration to be just another example of "Western liberal parochialism" masquerading as universalism.
Perhaps Bell would want to narrow the range of what counts as a scheme of fundamental human rights to allow for cultural particularities. Perhaps he would want to jettison the "democratic elements" of a scheme of human rights to allow for a greater range of cultural variation but stick with the basic liberal rights, those rights that Taylor, for example, characterizes as "fundamental" and "unassailable." This would cause Bell difficulties, to be sure, since he is committed to the struggle for democracy in China. Nonetheless, he might argue that democratic principles are radically at odds with certain cultural traditions and should not be universally advanced. And perhaps he would want to go even further and endorse, as John Rawls does in his essay "The Law of Peoples,"6 a minimal conception of human rights, one that is intended to be neither distinctively liberal nor democratic. Rawls maintains in this essay that his goal, in part, is to outline a theory of human rights that is not "in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures"7 and that can, therefore, be endorsed by a wide range of cultures (i.e., can be the focus of an "overlapping consensus"). Finally, inasmuch as certain rights are classified as human rights, they are both egalitarian and universalistic. They are egalitarian because they are held equally by all persons in virtue of their common humanity, and they are universalistic because common humanity means just that-the same everywhere and, therefore, of course, the same in all cultures (i.e., the concept of human rights is radically at odds with the concept of "Confucian human rights," "Buddhist human rights," etc.). Human rights are a fundamentally transcultural concept.
Bell would perhaps reject that liberty of conscience and free speech must be included among fundamental human rights. I will simply conjecture that Bell would accept that they should be on the basis of two observations. First, Bell opens with a reference to the Chinese protesters who were massacred in the ruling class while practicing a broad system of religious toleration toward the largely self-governing Christian and Jewish "millets. Given that "well-ordered hierarchical societies" do not uphold full and equal individual liberty of conscience and freedom of speech, they fail to protect certain basic human rights. If we accept this, then Rawls's attempt to formulate a "nonindividualistic" (i.e., nonliberal) theory of fundamental human rights fails. This points to the necessity for a "liberal" formulation of the principle of human rights. On this view, rights, as employed in the phrase "human rights," are fundamentally individualistic in two related senses.13 First, they accrue to individuals and only to individuals rather than to individuals as members of "corporate bodies": they protect individuals against the actions of any and all collectivities. Second, such rights give to the individual who possesses them what H.L.A. Hart has called a kind of "sovereignty" over her moral world:14 to have a right is to be in a position to impose a duty on a collectivity or a political regime-any political regime-to act in certain ways toward the possessor of the right. Hence, individual rights in large measure determine and limit the form of any state (or of any unit of collective control). Finally, inasmuch as certain rights are classified as human rights, they are both egalitarian and universalistic. They are egalitarian because they are held equally by all persons in virtue of their common humanity, and they are universalistic because common humanity means just that-the same everywhere and, therefore, of course, the same in all cultures (i.e., the concept of human rights is radically at odds with the concept of "Confucian human rights," "Buddhist human rights," etc.). Human rights are a fundamentally transcultural concept.
Bell would perhaps reject that liberty of conscience and free speech must be included among fundamental human rights. I will simply conjecture that Bell would accept that they should be on the basis of two observations. First, Bell opens with a reference to the Chinese protesters who were massacred in the ruling class while practicing a broad system of religious toleration toward the largely self-governing Christian and Jewish "millets. If we accept this liberal formulation, then the concept of fundamental human rights is a distinctively "Western" notion in the limited sense that it developed out of a particular cultural and historical tradition, that associated with the rise of Western liberalism. But Bell and Rawls are wrong, I believe, to emphasize the particularity of the moral intuition that underlies such a conception of human rights. According to Rawls, the idea that "human beings are moral persons and have equal worth" requires a "deep philosophical theory" or "comprehensive view" that many would reject as embodying principles "in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures."'6 Is it true that the idea that "human beings are moral persons and have equal worth" is part of a particular "comprehensive moral doctrine" or requires such a doctrine for its justification? This idea, or something analogous to it, has been expressed in a variety of ways in a variety of different religious and philosophical traditions (though of course, by no means all). Thus, it is not necessarily a conception that depends upon one "Western" "comprehensive doctrine"; rather, it could itself be the focus of an overlapping consensus. This point would be helpful to Bell's project, for it would show that other cultural traditions-by which Bell seems to mean religious traditions (all of his examples concern non-Western religions)-may contain resources to support something akin to a liberal conception of fundamental human rights norms.
But there are several points to be made in regard to Bell's approach of "cultural interpretation." First, the extent to which something analogous to basic human rights norms can be derived from within diverse religiouscultural traditions is clearly a matter of degree. Values that could support basic equal rights for all persons regardless of race, religion, or gender may be virtually nonexistent in a given religious-cultural tradition or of such marginal significance as to defy anything like an "interpretive derivation" of human rights. Second, the project of attempting to find resources within a given cultural tradition, no matter how marginal, to guide that tradition to support basic human rights, does not necessarily free one from the charge of the "hegemony" of Western liberalism. After all, the goal is to guide these traTiananmen Square. If anything, these dissidents fought and died for a right to free speech. Second, part of Bell's essay (pp. 576-78) is devoted to a sympathetic review of the book Le moine et le philosophe: Le bouddhisme aujourd'hui,15 which recounts how Matthieu Ricard, a molecular biologist, left his career "to take up a full time 'career' as a Buddhist monk at the age of twenty-six" (pp. 576-77). The right to religious conversion, forbidden in the millet system, is a paradigmatic instance of individual liberty of conscience. So I will assume that Bell himself is at least in part committed to what I have identified as a largely liberal conception of fundamental human rights.
If we accept this liberal formulation, then the concept of fundamental human rights is a distinctively "Western" notion in the limited sense that it developed out of a particular cultural and historical tradition, that associated with the rise of Western liberalism. But Bell and Rawls are wrong, I believe, to emphasize the particularity of the moral intuition that underlies such a conception of human rights. According to Rawls, the idea that "human beings are moral persons and have equal worth" requires a "deep philosophical theory" or "comprehensive view" that many would reject as embodying principles "in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures."'6 Is it true that the idea that "human beings are moral persons and have equal worth" is part of a particular "comprehensive moral doctrine" or requires such a doctrine for its justification? This idea, or something analogous to it, has been expressed in a variety of ways in a variety of different religious and philosophical traditions (though of course, by no means all). Thus, it is not necessarily a conception that depends upon one "Western" "comprehensive doctrine"; rather, it could itself be the focus of an overlapping consensus. This point would be helpful to Bell's project, for it would show that other cultural traditions-by which Bell seems to mean religious traditions (all of his examples concern non-Western religions)-may contain resources to support something akin to a liberal conception of fundamental human rights norms.
But there are several points to be made in regard to Bell's approach of "cultural interpretation." First, the extent to which something analogous to basic human rights norms can be derived from within diverse religiouscultural traditions is clearly a matter of degree. Values that could support basic equal rights for all persons regardless of race, religion, or gender may be virtually nonexistent in a given religious-cultural tradition or of such marginal significance as to defy anything like an "interpretive derivation" of human rights. Second, the project of attempting to find resources within a given cultural tradition, no matter how marginal, to guide that tradition to support basic human rights, does not necessarily free one from the charge of the "hegemony" of Western liberalism. After all, the goal is to guide these tra- The standard by which we judge the minimal requirements a conception of human rights must meet (i.e., the requisite scope and priority of individual rights), if we acknowledge that there is such a standard, would have to be transcultural, otherwise we would have no way of saying whether or not a given culture or political regime complied with or violated fundamental human rights. And if we don't acknowledge such a standard to exist, then there is no point in talking about fundamental human rights at all. If there is no transcending cultural particularity, then there are no universal norms and no fundamental human rights that can be demanded by all persons. And if there is no transcending cultural particularity, there is no possibility of a mulditions in a direction that, left to themselves, they might not otherwise have gone. The academic "interpretivists" are looking within diverse religious traditions to find values and principles that can be emphasized ( The standard by which we judge the minimal requirements a conception of human rights must meet (i.e., the requisite scope and priority of individual rights), if we acknowledge that there is such a standard, would have to be transcultural, otherwise we would have no way of saying whether or not a given culture or political regime complied with or violated fundamental human rights. And if we don't acknowledge such a standard to exist, then there is no point in talking about fundamental human rights at all. If there is no transcending cultural particularity, then there are no universal norms and no fundamental human rights that can be demanded by all persons. And if there is no transcending cultural particularity, there is no possibility of a mulditions in a direction that, left to themselves, they might not otherwise have gone. The academic "interpretivists" are looking within diverse religious traditions to find values and principles that can be emphasized ( 
